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Farrell: Hearsay

HEARSAY, THE NEW YORK AND FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE: WHAT'S THE
DIFFERENCE?
Hon George C. Pratt:

We move on. Next, we have Professor Farrell. The topic, I
guess, is overall hearsay. Is that a fair characterization, Professor
Farrell?
ProfessorRichard T. Farrell*:
Being a descendent of hod carriers, overall is probably a good

way to put it.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Professor Farrell comes to us from Brooklyn Law School.
ProfessorRichardT. Farrell:
INTRODUCTION

My volunteer is passing around a
eventually become the eleventh
Evidence. 1 We are in page proofs
We expect to go to the printer by
beginning of next month.

preliminary draft of what will
edition of Richardson on
on half of the book already.
the end of this month or the

* Richard T. Farrell is presently a professor at Brooklyn Law School.
Some of the courses he teaches include, Legal Research and Writing,
Evidence, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, and Conflict of Laws. Prior to
teaching, Professor Farrell clerked for the New York State Court of Appeals
from 1965 until 1967. He also helped publish the tenth edition of Richardson
on Evidence and is in the middle of publishing the forthcoming 1lth edition.
1. JEROME PRINCE

ET AL.,

RICHARDSON

ON

EVIDENCE

(l1th

ed.

forthcoming).
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Let me just say a word about codification. What difference
does it make? I am in favor of it and I cannot see anything wrong
with the present system.
When I was preparing for this lecture, I ran across some other
lecture notes I had prepared for another program. One of my
favorite quotes turns out to be from the judicial writings of none
other than the Honorable Jacob D. Fuchsberg, 2 after whom this
law center is named. Judge Fuchsberg, in People v. Rivera,3
reminded us that, "in this imperfect world, the right ...

to a fair

appeal or, for that matter a fair trial, does not necessarily
guarantee ...

a perfect trial or a perfect appeal."

4

The whole

idea of programs like this is to try to get a little bit closer to the
ideal, a universal understanding, or a general agreement among
the profession as to what certain things mean.
Now, most of you have already received a copy of this
particular material. I would like to call your attention to
something. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence there is a
definition of hearsay. 5 We have been talking about hearsay for
the last half hour or so, but so far we have not agreed on what it
is we are talking about. Hearsay is defined in Federal Rule of
Evidence 801.6 Now, I would like to call your attention to the
2. Judge Jacob D. Fuchsberg is a New York University Law School

graduate who had an illustrious career as a trial attorney. As an attorney he
received the first one million dollar verdict in the nation. Judge Fuchsberg was
elected to the New York Court of Appeals in 1974. Sketches of the Judges on
State's Court of Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1982, at 54. He was one of the
past presidents of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association as well as the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America. Judge Fuchsberg retired from the
court in 1983. He is currently a senior partner at the Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law

Firm in Manhattan, New York. This biography was taken from, Jacob D.
Fuchsberg, Law, Social Policy, and Contagious Disease: A Symposium on
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1
(1985).
3. 39 N.Y.2d 519, 349 N.E.2d 825, 384 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1976).

4. Id. at 523, 349 N.E.2d at 828, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
5. See infra note 6 (discussing the definition of hearsay as stated in the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
6. FED. R. EvID. 801(c). Rule 801 defines hearsay as "a statement, other

than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Id. In addition, the rule
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material I passed out. Please look at the second paragraph of

section 8-101. 7 By the way, I am rearranging the materials in
Richardson on Evidence so that Article I will deal with general
principles, Article II will discuss judicial evidence, Article III

will explain presumptions, Article IV will clarify circumstantial
evidence, etc. In other words, it will be arranged in a similar
manner as the material in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8

Look at how the "feds" define hearsay 9 and also look at section
8-101 from Richardson: "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,

offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."

10

Now, I will go out and get you one of those big Famous Amos
cookies if you tell me the difference between hearsay pursuant to

the Federal Rules of Evidence and the general accepted definition
outlines the circumstances where a statement is not considered hearsay and
would thus be admissible. FED. R. EvID. 801(d).
7. The following is a draft of the proposed § 8-101 which will be found
in the forthcoming I1th edition of Richardson on Evidence:
The rule barring hearsay is one of the most important exclusionary rules
in the law of evidence. As a working definition, we may say that a
statement made out of court, that is, not made in the course of the trial
in which it is offered, is hearsay if it is offered for the truth of the fact
asserted in the statement. The definition of hearsay, of course, applies
to what is written as well as to what is spoken. If the evidence is
hearsay, and no exception to the rule is applicable, the evidence must be
excluded upon appropriate objection to its admission.
PRINCE ET AL., supra note 1,§ 8-101 (citations omitted).
8. The Federal Rules of Evidence are organized as a series of eleven
articles. The rules are arranged in the following order: Article I contains
general provisions; Article II, judicial notice; Article Ill, presumptions in civil
actions and proceedings; Article IV, relevancy and its limits; Article V.
privileges; Article VI, witnesses; Article VII, opinions and expert testimony;
Article VIII, hearsay; Article IX, authentication and identification; Article X.
contents of writings, recordings, and photographs: and Article Xi,
miscellaneous rules. Therefore, Richardson on Evidence should correlate more
directly with the articles in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
9. See supra note 6.
10. FED. R. EvID. 801(c). See PRINCE ET AL.. supra note I. § 8-101
(defining hearsay as "a statement made out of court, that is. not made in the
course of the trial in which it is offered, is hearsay if it is offered for the truth
of the fact asserted in the statement").
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of what hearsay is under the New York cases.ll So here is the
good news. The good news is that when you look at the kind of
hodgepodge that the New York law of evidence is, it is a little bit

of common law, a little bit of statute, 12 a little bit of this, a little
bit of that, but all in all, it turns out to be not that terribly
different than the Federal Rules of Evidence. 13

I think it is a mistake to overemphasize the differences. By
emphasizing the differences, you create the idea that we are
talking about apples and oranges. But, in reality, it is not that
different. There are merely some subtle differences. One might
get the idea from what someone said earlier about Judge
Weinstein's view of the world, that everything rests in the
discretion of the trial judge.14 I guess this is true as long as the
11. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; cf. People v. Bolden, 58
N.Y.2d 741, 743, 445 N.E.2d 198, 199, 459 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (1982)
(Gabrielli, J., concurring) (defining hearsay as "lain out of court statement of
the declarant, communicated at the trial by a third party, is generally hearsay if
it is offered for the truth of the fact asserted in the statement" (citing JEROME
PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 200, at 176-77 (10th ed. 1973)));
People v. Sease-Bey, Ill A.D.2d 195, 488 N.Y.S.2d 822 (2d Dep't 1985).
The appellate division followed the New York Court of Appeals in adopting
the Richardson on Evidence definition of hearsay. Id. at 195, 488 N.Y.S.2d at
824.
12. See, e.g., Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That is the
Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58
BROOK. L. REV. 641 (1992) (discussing the make-up of New York's rules of
evidence).
13. See HAROLD J. BAER, JR., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THEIR
NEW YORK STATE PARALLELS (1986). See I RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT ET AL.,
NEW YORK EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS (1993) for a comparison and
overview of the New York and Federal Rules of Evidence.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Sessa, 806 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (E.D.
N.Y. 1992) ("Whether or not psychiatric testimony is admissible to impeach
the credibility of a witness is within the discretion of the trial judge." (citing
United States v. Pacelli, 521 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1975))); Earl v. Bouchard
Transp. Co., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1167, 1174 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The
admissibility of evidence regarding future earning capacity is within the wide
discretion of the trial judge." (citing Oliveri v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 849
F.2d 742, 745 (2d Cir. 1988))); Cathleen C. Herasimchuck, The Relevancy
Revolution in Criminal Law: A Practical Tour Through the Texas Rules of
Criminal Evidence, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 737, 776 n. 97 (1989) ("The trial
.judge's experience and legal training can be relied upon to winnow the chaff
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trial judge is Judge Weinstein. But the black flag of anarchy flies
over the federal courthouse in the courtroom where everything is
up to the discretion of the trial judge. Then who is in charge?
The answer is, like in any anarchy situation, nobody is in charge
and everybody is in charge. It is not that way at all. The good
news is that most of the rules are pretty much the same. The bad
news, of course, is that there are differences.
THE HEARSAY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NEW
YORK AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
There are two similarities and differences that I would like to
address this morning. Now, one philosophic difference - what is
hearsay? Hearsay is evidence of an out-of-court statement offered
to prove some fact contained in that statement. 15 I do not think
anybody has told you about what the hearsay rule is. If you have
a pencil please write down the hearsay rule right now. No Aqui.
No se habla hearsay. That is the hearsay rule. Very simple? No,
because when you are discussing hearsay, you are in fact
discussing the exceptions to the rule. 16
A. Admissions
What is it that fits the definition of hearsay that can be received
in evidence to prove some fact contained in this out-of-court
from the wheat." (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE 104[021, at 104-22 (1985))).
15. See BLACK'S LAv DICTIONARY 649 (5th ed. 1979). Hearsay is defined
as "[a] statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Id.; see also supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
16. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1). This rule lists the situations in which
prior statements by a witness are not hearsay, for example when a statement is
consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut a charge of
fabrication. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 lists the hearsay exceptions
which apply regardless of the declarant's availability, for example the present
sense impression or the excited utterance. FED. R. EvID. 803. Rule 804 lists
the exceptions to the hearsay rule that can only be used if the declarant is
unavailable. FED. R. EVID. 804.
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statement? It is the exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the
places where an apparent difference occurs between the federal
rules and the New York rules of evidence is when you deal with
the first exception to the hearsay rule, admissions. 17 If you look
at the Federal Rules of Evidence, you will see that they tell us
what hearsay is not. 18 Among other things, the statement is not
hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is the
party's own statement. 19
Now, in New York's original volume in 1980,20 as well as in
the most recent version, 2 1 the New York view is that an
admission is an exception to the hearsay rule, 22 because the
17. See Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage Corp., No. 94-7157,
1994 WL 541804, at *7 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 1994) (holding that "[a]ssertions by a
party in documents it has prepared and offers into evidence are admissible
against it as admissions"). Admissions are defined as "[clonfessions,
concessions or voluntary acknowledgments made by a party of the existence of
certain facts. More accurately regarded, they are statements by a party, or
some one identified with him in legal interest, of the existence of a fact which
is relevant to the cause of his adversary." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 47 (6th
ed. 1990).
18. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence hearsay is not a prior
statement made by a witness if the statement is (1) "inconsistent with the
declarant's testimony" if the testimony was given under oath, or (2)
"consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive," or (3) an identification of a person made subsequently to
perceiving the person. FED R. EvID. 801(d)(1). In addition, hearsay is not an
admission by a party opponent. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
19. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). The rule provides in pertinent part: "A
statement is not hearsay if (2) the statement is offered against a party and is
(A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative
capacity." Id. See Wheel v. Robinson, No. 93-2307, 1994 WL 465494, at *5
(2d Cir. Aug. 25, 1994) (holding that the plaintiff's statements were admissible
as admissions by a party).
20. NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A CODE OF EVIDENCE
FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK 9 (1980).
21. NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1991).

A CODE OF EVIDENCE

22. See Giles v. Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 199
A.D.2d 613, 614, 604 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346 (3d Dep't 1993) (stating that it is
"uncontested that an admission against interest made by a party to a civil
action is competent evidence against that party as an exception to the hearsay
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admissions exception allows evidence of an out-of-court
statement to be received into evidence to prove some fact
23
contained in the statement.
The federal rules found, and I think quite correctly, that there
is one thing about all the other exceptions to the hearsay rule you
really cannot say about an admission. For most of the other
exceptions from the hearsay rule, there is at least some nuance,
some taste, some hint of reliability. 24 I will give you an example.
When somebody says, "I know that I have done wrong. I know
that burning down O'Leary's Bar and Grill was a bad thing to
do," you get the kind of curbstone idea that if somebody is going
to go around saying something like that, he knows when he is
saying it that he is making a declaration of his responsibility, in a
monetary sense, for the arson of O'Leary's Bar, and, perhaps, in
the criminal sense, for the crime of arson. We are perfectly
willing to believe that when people say bad things about
themselves, they are probably telling the truth. 25 Also when
somebody says a good thing about themselves like, "I am not a
crook," you tend to disbelieve them.
Now, there is another thing. Of the two people involved, one is
the person who made the statement, the declarant. 26 When I give
rule"); People v. Patterson, 184 A.D.2d 916, 918, 584 N.Y.S.2d 954, 956 (3d
Dep't 1992) (holding that the defendant's statement made to a testifying
witness was admissible under the admission exception to the hearsay rule).
23. See cases cited supra note 22 (discussing New York's view on
admissions).
24. See JONAKAIT ET AL., supra note 13, at 271-94. Hearsay exceptions

based primarily on a showing of reliability include business records, past
recollection recorded, present recollection refreshed, excited or startled
utterances, present sense impressions or contemporaneous statements,
declarations of state of mind or emotion, and declarations of bodily condition.
Id.
25. See Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 341, 54 N.E. 737, 740 (1899).
"The theory upon which this class of cases is held to be competent is that it is
highly improbable that a party will admit or state anything against himself or
against his own interest unless it is true." Id.
26. A declarant is "a person who makes a statement.- FED. R. EVID.
80 1(b). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 407 (6th ed. 1990). A declarant is "lal
person who makes a declaration .... In the law of evidence. la declarationi is
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the introductory lecture on hearsay, I use a cartoon of Donald
Duck, the "duck"-clarant, is a person whose statement is being
testified to by somebody else. 27 Then, I use a cartoon of Yogi
Bear, the bear is the witness. The duck is the "duck"-clarant, the
bear is the witness. When the bear wants to testify on trial to
28
what the duck said, this is the classic hearsay problem.
The problem with the admissions exception to the hearsay rule,
29
is that there is no circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.
As one of the sections in the material that I have distributed to
you points out, the New York rule of admission is a statement
made by a party, anytime, anywhere, to anybody, that turns out
down the road to be contrary to that party's position on trial. 30
For example, let us look at vicarious liability31 under Section
388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law in New York. 32 Pursuant to
an unsworn statement or narration of facts made by a party to the transaction,
or by one who has an interest in the existence of the facts recounted." Id.
27. See supra note 26 (defining declarant).
28. See, e.g., Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675, 684 (N.D. 1970)
(holding that statement to adjuster was hearsay since declarant, who was not a
party in the action, did not testify at trial, nor was the statement subject to
cross-examination).
29. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. See Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 341, 54 N.E. 737, 740 (1899)
(stating that "admissions by a party of any fact material to the issue are always
competent evidence against him, wherever, whenever or to whomever made");
see also PRINCE ET AL., supra note 1, § 8-201 (11th ed. forthcoming). "As a
general rule, any declaration or conduct of a party which is inconsistent with
the party's position on trial may be given in evidence against that party as an
admission." Id.

31. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990). Vicarious liability
is defined as "[tlhe imposition of liability on one person for the actionable
conduct of another, based solely on a relationship between the two
persons ... for example, the liability of an employer for the acts of an
employee, or, a principal for torts and contracts of an agent." Id. For a
general overview of vicarious liability see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499-501 (5th ed. 1984).
32. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1986). Section 388
provides in pertinent part:
Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable
and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting
from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business
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this statute the owner of an automobile is liable for injuries
caused by the driver. 33 In the following example, we will assume
that the driver is operating the car with the owner's permission.
Suppose that back on March 16, 1993, the owner of a car is
walking down the street and meets a friend and says, "Hey
friend." Friend says, "Hey owner, how are you doing?" "I am
fine, how are you doing?" "Hey, you are walking, where is your
car?" "Oh, I loaned my car to my neighbor, Fred." Now, that is
a perfectly innocuous statement. What surrounded that statement?
Any kind of guarantee of the trustworthiness of, "Where is your
car?" "I Loaned it to Fred." Let us say that Fred goes out that
night and gets into an accident. Now, who winds up being sued?
The owner. He gets on the stand and he testifies, "Yeah, I told
him he could move the car from the driveway to the sidewalk.
That is what I told him. I did not say he could drive out to the
North Fork of Long Island." Can the bear get on the stand and
testify that the party, the duck, the defendant, the owner, said
that he had loaned his car to Fred? Sure he can. But where is the
circumstantial guarantee of trustvorthiness? This is a perfectly
neutral statement made under the circumstances when you
cannot, even with the most fevered imagination, come up with
any argument that when the owner of the car said, "I loaned it to
Fred" he had not even a hint or a trace, unless he is paranoid,
that anything in that statement would come back and haunt him as
evidence, as part of the predicate for his liability under section
388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
Now, I believe, influenced by the lack of trustworthiness that
surrounds the admission, the defense decided to exclude it from
the definition of hearsay. However now look at what happens.
You get to the bottom line at the trial, or the civil action in the
state system. Can the jury take the testimony of the witness that
the owner said, "I loaned the car to Fred" and use that statement
as the basis for a finding that Fred was driving the car with the
of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same
with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.
Id.
33. Id.
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owner's permission? Answer: Yes. In the federal system, it is the

34
same question. Is that statement a statement made by a party?
Can it be heard in evidence in the federal system? Yes. 35 What is
the jury to do with this statement? The jury can use the fact
content of that statement, the non hearsay statement, as the
predicate for their finding of fact that the car was being operated

with the owner's permission. 3 6 The bottom line result is that
there is no difference except for this quibble of characterization.

So is it, or is it not, an exception to the hearsay rule?
B. The Business Records Exception
In People v. Kennedy, 3 7 Chief Judge, Judith Kaye, 3 8 referred

to the business records exception as "the most important
exception to the hearsay rule. '' 3 9 I do not know about that. The

state version is basically the codification of a suggestion made
34. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A), supra note 19. See United States v.
Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986). In a
criminal prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute heroin, the
defendant's act of pointing to a coconspirator was assertive in nature thus
establishing a party admission. Id. Therefore, under the Federal Rules of
Evidence it did not constitute hearsay. Id. at 8.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Penass, 997 F.2d 1227, 1229 (7th Cir.
1993) (stating that defendant's own statement, "I know I did it

... I

hit her in

the head with an ax," was admissible against defendant in criminal prosecution
for assault with a deadly weapon).
36. See United States v. Cline, 570 F.2d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 1978)
(allowing the jury in a second degree murder trial, to consider defendant's
statement concerning the whereabouts of the murder weapon as substantive
evidence "because it qualified as an admission").
37. 68 N.Y.2d 569, 503 N.E.2d 501, 510 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1986).
38. Judith Kaye is the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals
appointed by Mario Cuomo in 1993. Chief Judge Kaye is a former partner of
the Manhattan law firm of Olwine, Connelly, Chase, O'Donnell & Weyher as
well as a past director and vice president of the Legal Aid Society. This
biography was taken from, Judith S. Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A
Study in Progress Toward Gender Equality, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 125
(1988).
39. Kennedy, 68 N.Y.2d at 578, 503 N.E.2d at 507, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 859
("The business records exception has been recognized as probably the most
important hearsay exception.").
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back in the 1920's by the Commonwealth Fund. 40 This is a
forerunner, an early version of the American Law Institute and
its statement. The business records exception of the hearsay rule

in New York is found in the Civil Practice Laws and Rules
section 4518 [hereinafter CPLR]. 4 1 It is found in Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(6).42 If you put the two statutes side by side, they
will be almost identical, there is very little difference in the
common progenitor of this commonwealth statute. 4 3 The big
difference is, if the particular document, the business record,
qualifies under the CPLR, the circumstances surrounding its
preparation, under New York law, go to the weight to be
afforded the information received from the business record. 44
40. The Commonwealth Fund was a charitable foundation organized to
encourage legal research. One of its first tasks was to "reform the law of
evidence." After five years the committee issued a report suggesting five
changes in the law of evidence. For a general overview of the work of the
committee, see generally Salken, supra note 12, at 654.
41. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4518 (McKinney 1992). Rule 4518(a)
provides in pertinent part:
Generally. Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a
book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act,
transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in
proof of that act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the judge finds that
it was made in the regular course of any business and that it was the
regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act,
transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter.
Id.
42. FED. R. EvID. 803(6). Rule 803(6) provides in pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions. opinions, or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report. record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Id.
43. See Salken, supra note 12, at 654.
44. See People v. Kennedy, 68 N.Y.2d 569, 576, 503 N.E.2d 501. 505.
510 N.Y.S.2d 853, 857 (1986). "Whether records admitted pursuant to CPLR
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The circumstances surrounding the preparation of the business
record go toward the weight of the business record. 45 I Will give
you an example. In Toll v. State,4 6 a leading New York
Appellate Division case written by Judge Cooke, 47 the business
record that was in question was an accident report. 48 The report
had been prepared by the very individual whose conduct led to
the suit against his employer, the State of New York. 49 Now,
you can imagine that the snow plow driver, when he was writing
up his accident report, had considerable incentive to put a tinge
of favorability on his description of how the accident occurred.
Objection was made to the admission of this otherwise qualifying
report as a business record on the ground that it had been
prepared by the very person whose conduct had caused the law
suit to be brought against the defendant. In addition, it was the
50
defendant who was offering the accident report into evidence.
Judge Cooke, in a different decision, held that the
circumstances surrounding the preparation of the record goes
toward the weight to be afforded to the evidence drawn out of
this business record. 5 1 The Federal Rules of Evidence state that
the trial judge, here we go back to that observation about Judge
4518(a) are in fact regular business records is not ... a matter going only to
Ithel weight of the evidence; other circumstances of the making of the record
may go to [thel weight once the threshold requirements for admissibility are
met." Id.
45. Id.
46. 32 A.D.2d 47, 299 N.Y.S.2d 589 (3d Dep't 1969).
47. Judge Lawrence Cooke was elected county judge and surrogate of

Sullivan County in 1955 six years prior to being elected to the New York State
Supreme Court. Judge Cooke was elected to the New York Court of Appeals

in 1974 and was named Chief Judge in 1979. He retired from the bench in
1985. This biography was taken from, Sketches of the Judges on State's Court
of Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1982, at 54.

48. Toll, 32 A.D.2d at 48, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See People v. Porter, 46 A.D.2d 307, 311, 362 N.Y.S.2d 249, 255
(3d Dep't 1974). Judge Cooke determined that even though certain entries
were out of chronological order, they would not be prevented from being
admitted into evidence. However, such a deficiency would effect the weight to
be given the evidence found in the record. Id.
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Weinstein, 52 has the discretion to reject an otherwise qualifying
business record, if the trial judge concludes that the
circumstances surrounding its preparation indicate substantial
53
lack of trustworthiness.
The New York and Federal Rules of Evidence are the same,
but in one case the state rule allows more into evidence than the
federal system does. 54 Bob Pitler 55 and I were discussing this
earlier, and Bob has identified at least fifteen places in the
hearsay area alone, where the law of state and the federal rules
56
part company.
52. See supra text accompanying note 1A.
53. See United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating
that it was within the discretion of the trial court judge to refuse to admit a
telex into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule
because the circumstances of the preparation of the document indicate a lack of
trustworthiness); see also supra note 42 discussing Federal Rule of Evidence
803(6).
54. Although the Federal and New York Rules of Evidence appear similar,
as illustrated below, the courts have interpreted them differently. See supra
note 42 defining Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) compared to New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules section 4518 supra note 41; see also Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943) (stating that Rule 803(6) only applies to a
record drafted during the regular course of business, however, the rule does
not extend to any regular course of conduct associated with the business);
Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 127, 170 N.E. 517, 518 (1930) (stating that
the person who reports the transaction must be acting within the regular course
of business). See generally JACK B.

WEINSTEIN, BASIC PROBLEIMS OF STATE

AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE 275-78 (5th ed. 1976) (discussing the business
records exception and specifically explaining that the federal interpretation is
more restrictive than the New York interpretation).
55. Robert Pitler is a professor at Brooklyn Law School where he teaches
Criminal Justice, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence. He clerked for Judge
Breitel from 1974-75. Professor Pitler is a former New York City District
Attorney as well as a former Chief of the Appeals Bureau of the Manhattan
District Attorney's office. THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 19931994 765 (1994).
56. The following are a few examples of where the federal and New York
state rules part company in the hearsay area. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) allows an
admission made by the agent of a party to be used against the party. FED R.
EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). In Cox v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 693, 698, 148 N.E.2d 879,
882, 171 N.Y.S.2d 818, 821-22 (1958), the court of appeals held that an
employee's statement lacked the reliability of a statement made by the actual
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C. PresentSense Impression

Let me make one more observation about the dynamics of the
common law system. In a case called People v. Nieves, 57 the
New York Court of Appeals stated that it was "not prepared at
this time to abandon the well-established reliance on specific
categories of hearsay exceptions in favor of an amorphous
'reliability' test . . . . 58 I always get nervous when I hear "not
at this time," but tomorrow, watch out.
Despite this sentiment, as recently as a few months ago, the
New York State Court of Appeals, fell into line and in People v.
Brown59 adopted the present sense impression exception to the
hearsay rule, 60 which is the first of the enumerated exceptions to
party and could not be admitted into evidence. Id. In People v. Brown, 80
N.Y.2d 729, 734-35, 610 N.E.2d 369, 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700 (1993),
the court recognized the present sense impression exception to hearsay in
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1). Id. However, the court stated that the
statement must be corroborated by other evidence, thus differentiating it from
the New York rules. Id. A third difference between the state and Federal Rules
of Evidence concerns the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. In People
v. Chambers, 125 A.D.2d 88, 91-92, 512 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (1st Dep't 1987),
the court noted that a statement about the state of mind of a declarant was
admissible. Id. However, the court exacted a stringent test making such
statements admissible only where there is a high degree of truthfulness found
within the statement. Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply such a
stringent test in allowing this exception. Finally, Federal Rule 803(24) allows
statements that are hearsay to be admitted into evidence where the statements
are reliable but they do not fit into one of the stated exceptions. FED. R. EVID.
803(24). New York, on the other hand, rejected this idea in People v. Nieves,
67 N.Y.2d 125, 131, 492 N.E.2d 109, 112, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1986).
57. 67 N.Y.2d 125, 492 N.E.2d 109, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1986).
58. Id. at 131, 492 N.E.2d at 112, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
59. 80 N.Y.2d 729, 610 N.E. 2d 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1993).
60. People v. Woods, 610 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (4th Dep't 1994) (holding
that "statements made contemporaneously with or immediately after the events
described, were admissible under the present sense impression exception to the
hearsay rule"); Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 729, 610 N.E.2d at 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d
at 696. The court in Brown held that a spontaneous description of the events in
question that are made "contemporaneously with the observation are
admissible if" they are substantially corroborated by other evidence. Id. In
addition, the court held that such statements are admissible even if the
declarant is simply an unidentified witness and not a participant in the events.
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the hearsay rule in New York and Federal Rule of Evidence
803(1).61
CONCLUSION

While I will concede very rapidly that the common law system
is, perhaps, not as efficient as the legislative alternative because
courts have this very passive mode, they will decide questions
when they come, but they will not reach out and try to decide
things until they are put into position of having assignment. But
do not abandon hope, oh ye in favor of codification, it will
happen eventually. We are not stuck in a system that is so
grounded in the common law. Remember the common law era,
the height of which was back in the time when some historian
said that life was nasty, British, and short. If you look at the
history of that era, so were some of the people.
It is always a pleasure to come visit. Thank you very much for
having me.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you Professor Farrell. I think once your revision of
Richardson on Evidence is published, which will follow the
format of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it may be a long step
toward codification, because a quick reference to define what the
state rule of evidence is for most lawyers is to run to Richardson.
Now, they are going to get used to seeing the same numbered
categories as in the federal rule.

Id.; Berger v. New York, 157 Misc. 2d 521, 597 N.Y.S.2d 555 (Sup. Ct.

N.Y. County 1993) (stating that the reason for this exception is that the
statement is made at the same time as the event thus, not leaving the declarant
time to reflect or intentionally misrepresent what was seen).
61. FED. R. EvID. 803(1). This rule provides that: "The following are not

excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness: a statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while
the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately
thereafter." Id.
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